We construct a perfectly competitive model of two symmetric countries producing tradable commodities and a public consumption good. Destination-or origin-based taxes are levied on the consumption of the tradable goods. In both countries, a fixed wage leads to involuntary unemployment. We derive the Nash equilibrium consumption taxes under the two taxation principles with endogenous world prices, and compare them to (i) the cooperative rates, and (ii) the rates when world prices are fixed. We demonstrate that with endogenous world prices, the induced terms-of-trade effects cancel out under the destination principle, but they prevail under the origin principle of taxation. Nash equilibrium destination-based taxes are inefficiently low when the exporting sector in each country is non-labour-intensive. The Nash equilibrium origin-based taxes can be either higher or lower than the corresponding cooperative rates.
INTRODUCTION
A key question in the international commodity taxation literature is whether destinationbased or origin-based commodity taxation leads to a socially efficient outcome when countries set taxes non-cooperatively. Numerous arguments have been analysed in favour of one policy instrument versus the other. 1 Moreover, OECD (2014) data regarding the share of VAT tax revenues over the tax aggregate revenues unveil an increasing trend, particularly after 2008 where the financial turmoil and its side effectse.g. higher unemployment rates-appeared. Eurostat (2014) reports that the standard VAT tax rate at the EU 28-country level averaged approximately 19.5% in the pre-2008 period. Thereafter a gradual increase in VAT taxes occurred that amounts to more than 10% with an increasing trend so as to achieve the fiscal consolidation and to combat current account imbalances. 2 Related to the above considerations, an extended discussion has been taking place among the EU member countries over the past two decades regarding the adoption of the appropriate principle of consumption taxation (European Commission 2011). Despite the fact that the origin principle is the preferred option by the European Commission and the European Parliament, the destination principle prevails as a politically viable instrument. As described in a recent press release from the European Commission (2014): 'After much political and technical consultation, it has appeared that an origin based system is not achievable and the consensus is that any definitive regime must be based on the principle of destination i.e. VAT is due at the point of destination of the goods'.
The present study contributes to this ongoing theoretical and policy debate for destination vs. origin-based international commodity taxation, by raising related issues, such as: in the presence of specific market distortions-e.g. involuntary unemploymentto what extent and via what channels can countries through international tax competition affect world commodity prices, employment conditions, and national welfare levels? Such issues, on the one hand, may explain the incentives of specific interest groups-i.e. workers, exporters or policymakers-in favouring destination vs. origin-based commodity taxes, or vice versa. On the other hand, they may resemble the experience of numerous OECD member countries which, especially after the occurrence of the financial turmoil, have recorded rising levels of unemployment, and which through world price effects can further impact levels of national employment, outputs and welfare. Having said this, one then may conjecture that governments may use domestic or trade tax policies in order to affect their terms of trade. 3 To address these issues, we construct a perfectly competitive model of two open economies introducing two policy-relevant analytical features: (i) involuntary unemployment due to a fixed, above its clearing level nominal wage; (ii) endogenous world commodity prices pointing to open economies that can affect international commodity prices via their policies, that is, so-called 'large' open economies. Destinationor origin-based taxes are levied on the consumption of these goods.
A key and rather interesting result is that in the present context, higher destinationor origin-based consumption taxes, under plausible conditions, have a positive impact on employment domestically and abroad. Specifically, when destination-based consumption taxes are imposed on non-labour-intensive commodities, lower demand for these commodities reduces their world relative price, thus raising the relative price of labourintensive commodities and levels of economy-wide employment. 4 A similar intuition applies for the ensuing positive employment effect-i.e. employment externality-in the other country. Under origin-based consumption taxes, an increase in their levels on nonlabour-intensive commodities results in a positive employment effect in that country. Yet the induced employment externality is positive only when the exporting goods are complements in consumption.
I. RELATED LITERATURE
The literature on destination-and origin-based principles of international commodity taxation is quite extensive and diverse in regards to the issues that it raises. A voluminous strand of this literature examines the implications of the two taxation principles in the context of general equilibrium models with perfectly competitive product and factore.g. labour and capital-markets.
In this context, Mintz and Tulkens (1986) , among others, characterize a noncooperative equilibrium between two regions choosing an origin-based tax levied on the same commodity. In a single commodity partial equilibrium model of destination-based tax competition between two countries, Kanbur and Keen (1993) conclude that differences in their size (population) exacerbate the inefficiencies of non-cooperative behaviour, harming them both. Lockwood (1993) examines the effect of switching from the destination to the origin principle of taxation on non-cooperative commodity tax equilibrium. Haufler (1994) examines the effects of a general commodity taxation under the restricted origin principle, when countries of an economic union are small vis-a-vis the rest of the world in international product markets. 5 Lockwood (2001) analyses commodity tax competition under destination and origin principles, accounting for international factor mobility vs. immobility and three types of potential spillovers: (i) consumer price spillover; (ii) producer price/terms-of-trade spillover; (iii) rent spillovers. Keen and Wildasin (2004) conclude that Pareto-efficient international taxation may require production inefficiencies in the allocation of world resources, thus the desirability of the destination basis for commodity taxation and of the residence principle for capital income taxation do not hold. 6 A second strand of this literature, not relevant to our study, examines the implications of international commodity taxation in the context of full employment and imperfectly competitive product markets; for example, Keen and Lahiri (1998) , Lockwood (2001) , Haufler and Pfl€ uger (2004, 2007) , Haufler et al. (2005) , Behrens et al. (2007 Behrens et al. ( , 2009 .
The aforementioned extensive literature has not considered the effects of the alternative regimes of international commodity taxation in the presence of factor markets distortions, for example, unemployment in labour markets. A notable exception is the study by Moriconi and Sato (2009) , who develop a model of two symmetric small open economies, that is, fixed world commodity prices, with a single factor of production, labour and unemployment, due to a minimum wage. They examine the impact of international tax competition on welfare and unemployment, showing, among other results, that (i) under the destination principle, commodity taxation has a negative employment externality, while under the origin principle, commodity taxation has a positive employment externality if the two goods are substitutes in consumption, and (ii) under the destination principle, non-cooperative equilibrium tax rates are higher than the optimal level, while under the origin principle, they are higher if the two goods are complements in consumption.
The model we develop in this study is more general in the sense of considering first, variable (i.e. endogenous) world commodity prices, and second, many factors of production. Analytically, the importance of these two model characteristics is the following. First, as far as endogenizing world commodity prices is concerned, assuming fixed world commodity prices limits the assessment of the impact of international commodity tax competition on unemployment. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first in the context of international tax competition to combine endogenous world commodity prices and involuntary unemployment. Aside of any 'practical matters' discussed previously, our justification for this extension rests with our model's specification per se. That is, from a general equilibrium point of view, in a two-country world, commodity prices are endogenously determined. Second, introducing many factors of production brings forth the pivotal importance of factor intensities in production, due to international commodity tax competition. It is imperative to note, as will be shown throughout the analysis to follow, that these two features of our model are strongly interrelated and constitute an important analytical contribution.
II. THE MODEL
Consider two open economies, Home and Foreign, with unemployment and public good provision. The variables of the latter country are denoted throughout by an asterisk (*). The two economies are symmetric in the sense of having identical and homothetic preferences for all households, and identical production technologies. The countries, however, may differ in terms of their population size. Let N denote Home's population, and let hN denote the population in Foreign. Following standard practice, we normalize N = 1, thus h denotes the relative size of Foreign. 7 Both countries are considered 'large' in world commodity markets, such that their tax policies affect world commodity prices. In each country, a representative household, derives utility from the consumption of three traded goods: x, y and z, and from the public consumption good g. Good z, the numeraire commodity, is produced in both countries, is untaxed, and has price equal to 1. 8 Good x is produced only by Home, and good y is produced only by Foreign. In each country there are a number of flex-price, fully-employed factors, and an additional fixed-price factor, labour, paid a binding, above the market clearing level, fixed wage x (x*), in terms of the numeraire. 9 Labour supply in each economy is infinitely elastic at this fixed wage x (x*). Employment L (L*) is smaller than each economy's labour endowment L ( L Ã ). In our setup, all workers, each endowed with L ( L Ã ) units of labour, are partially employed due to the wage rigidity, with only L (L*) units being employed and L À L ( L Ã À L Ã ) units being unemployed. Then xL (x*L*) denotes labour income. 10 Since households derive utility only from the consumption of commodities, all unemployment in the two economies is involuntary. 11 Perfect competition prevails in all commodity and factor markets, and p; p Ã denote, respectively, the world prices of commodities x and y, and are the producers' prices in the two countries.
We use duality theory to describe both the production and demand sides of an economy, e.g. Home. In production, let F(X, K, L) ≤ 0 denote the country's aggregate production possibilities set, where X (z, x) is the vector of goods produced, and K is the vector of all factors of production but labour, L. All factors are essential in the production of the numeraire and non-numeraire commodities in the two countries. The F(.) function is assumed to be convex with constant returns to scale technologies. Product and factor markets are perfectly competitive. Let R P; K; L ð Þ¼max X P 0 X : F X; K; L ð Þ 0 f g be the economy's unrestricted revenue function capturing the maximum value of national output in the absence of factor-price rigidities. 12 A prime ( 0 ) denotes a transposed vector, and P 1; p ð Þ. Because for the rest of the analysis the price of the numeraire is set equal to unity, without loss of generality, P p. Assuming a number of factors at least as great as the number of final products (i.e. two) ensures that R(.) is twice and continuously differentiable. 13 By the properties of the unrestricted revenue function we have the following:
Þis the supply function of x, and @ 2 R/ @ p 2 = R pp > 0, @ R/ @ L = R L is the marginal revenue product of labour, and @ 2 R/ @ L 2 = R LL < 0, @ R/ @ K = R K is the vector of marginal revenue products of all other factors, @ 2 R/ @ K 2 is a negative semi-definite matrix. 14 The properties of the R(.) function continue to hold when factor-price rigidities cause excess supply of some factors (e.g. labour) provided that their employment levels are interpreted as negative outputs sold at a fixed price x. If so, we construct the so-called factor-price-constrained-revenue function, defined as 15
The value of p(.) gives the income of the flex-price factors K. The differentiability of the p(.) function is ensured by assuming now a number of flex-price factors at least as great as the number of commodities produced. 16 Then, by the properties of this function, 17
Similarly, Foreign's factor-price-constrained-revenue function is defined as
where Y Ã z Ã ; y Ã ð Þ, and by the properties of revenue functions, p Ã
Since the endowments of all flex-price factors remain unchanged, K and K* are omitted from the rest of the analysis.
On the basis of the above, we define the Home and Foreign gross domestic product (GDP) functions, respectively, as follows:
The GDP in a minimum wage economy equals the GDP of an economy with full employment whose labour endowment is equal to the equilibrium level of employment in the minimum wage economy. With L\ L (L Ã \ L Ã ), GDP is not maximized in the minimum wage economy.
Turning to the demand side of the two minimum wage economies, we assume that each is inhabited by a number of identical households. For example, in Home, a representative household derives utility from consumption of the traded goods x, y, z, and of the public consumption good (g). Demand is described by the minimum expenditure function E(q x , q y , g, u) capturing the minimum expenditure required to achieve a given level of utility u at consumer prices q x and q y , and level of the public good g. 18 Regarding consumer prices, the government levies a specific consumption tax t i according to either the destination or the origin principle (i = d, o). When consumption is taxed according to the destination principle, q x = p + t d and q y = p* + t d . When it is taxed according to the origin principle, q
y) denotes the compensated demand for the jth commodity, E g is the socalled marginal willingness to pay for the public good, and E u is the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income. The expenditure function is strictly concave in consumer prices (i.e. E q x q x \0 and E q y q y \0), and the two commodities can be either substitutes (i.e. E q x q y [ 0) or complements (i.e. E q x q y \0) in consumption. It is assumed that the traded goods and public good are separable in consumption (i.e. E q x g ¼ E q y g ¼ 0), and that all income effects fall on the numeraire commodity
when it is taxed according to the origin principle. The partial derivatives of the E*(.) function with respect to its arguments use the same variables as those when differentiating E(.).
Each country's government finances the provision of the public consumption good g (g * ) through consumption tax revenues. Assuming that both governments maintain balanced budgets, under the destination principle we have 20
and under the origin principle we have A country's income expenditure identity requires that aggregate consumption spending of the privately produced goods equals income of the flex-price factors plus labour income. Thus under the two tax principles (i = d, o) for Home and Foreign, respectively, we have
Equilibrium in the world commodity markets for the two goods is given by
Equilibrium in the two-country model under the destination principle is described by conditions (1) and (3)-(6), and under the origin principle by conditions (2)-(6). In both cases we have a system of six equations in p, p*, g, g*, u, u*.
III. COMMODITY TAX COMPETITION AND WORLD PRICES
As noted in the Introduction, a theoretical and policy-related question of interest is to examine how and via what channels, in the presence of specific market distortions such as involuntary unemployment, international tax competition can affect world commodity prices. In the context of our model, changes in world (i.e. producers') prices due to changes in consumption taxes are given by differentiating equations (5) and (6) . Under the destination principle we obtain
denote changes in the world excess demands for commodities x and y due to changes in the tax rates t d and t Ã d . Details of the derivations of equations (7) and (8) are given in equations (A1) and (A2) in the Appendix. Equations (7) and (8) indicate that under the destination principle, when countries are symmetric, an increase in the consumption tax by either country lowers the world prices for both commodities x and y; that is, dp/dt d < 0, dp=dt Ã d \0, dp Ã =dt Ã d \0, dp*/dt d < 0, if the direct substitution effect of the tax increase dominates its cross-substitution effect (see equation (A2) in the Appendix). 21 Intuitively, a higher uniform destination tax by a country reduces the domestic consumption of non-numeraire commodities x and y. World (i.e. producers') prices for both commodities fall.
Under the origin principle, the differentiation of equations (5) and (6) yields
ð9Þ
Details of these derivations are given by equations (A3) and (A4) in the Appendix. Under origin-based consumption taxes, equations (9) and (10), on the one hand, indicate that independently of the relationship between the two goods in consumption, an increase in a country's own consumption tax rate lowers the producers' price, that is, dp/ dt o < 0 and dp Ã =dt Ã o \0. On the other hand, a higher consumption tax by one country reduces (increases) the other country's producers' price, that is, dp=dt Ã o \ð[Þ 0 and dp Ã =dt o \ð[Þ 0, if commodities are complements (substitutes) in consumption. For example, consider a higher origin tax by Home, while Foreign places no such a tax or maintains an existing origin-based consumption tax constant. Then world demand for good x falls, thus reducing the world price p. In turn, demand for commodity y falls (rises) if the two goods are complements (substitutes) in consumption. 22 In the former case dp*/dt o < 0, while in the latter dp*/dt o > 0. The following lemma summarizes these results.
Lemma 1.
Consider two symmetric open economies with unemployment. Destinationor origin-based taxes are levied on the consumption of traded commodities. Then:
• under the destination principle, a higher consumption tax by either country reduces the producers' prices in both countries;
• under the origin principle, a higher consumption tax by either country lowers the local producers' price, and it lowers (raises) the producers' price in the other country if the two commodities are complements (substitutes) in consumption.
IV. COMMODITY TAX COMPETITION, UNEMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE
We examine the welfare effects of the two principles of commodity taxation with endogenous terms of trade, unemployment, and provision of a local public good. Due to the assumed symmetry of the two countries, it suffices to examine the effects of commodity taxation on the welfare of one country (e.g. Home), and equivalently we derive the effects of commodity tax competition on Foreign's welfare. For clarity, our analysis and main results to follow assume symmetric countries of equal size, that is, h = 1. The final section of the paper discusses the main results for h 6 ¼ 1. (1), (3) and (4) with respect to consumption taxes t d and t Ã d , the effects on the two countries' welfare levels are
where dW ¼ E u du denotes the change in the household's welfare (real income), and
Under the invoked symmetry assumption, 1 + dp/dt d and 1 + dp*/dt d are positive. 24 The expressions W t d and W t d Ã , respectively, decompose the impact of changes in t d and t Ã d on Home's welfare. In W t d , we call the first right-hand-side term the terms-of-trade effect of the higher t d on the country's welfare. Assuming symmetric countries and h = 1, from the equilibrium conditions (5) and (6) 
Since both dp/dt d and dp*/dt d are negative, world prices for exports and imports fall. For Home, on the one hand, trade balance worsens due to lower value of exports, i.e. hE q y dp=dt d ð Þ\0, and on the other hand, it improves due to lower value of imports or consumption of y, i.e. ÀE q y dp Ã =dt d ð Þ[ 0. The two effects cancel each other out for h = 1, thus neutralizing the terms-of-trade effect of the higher t d on the country's welfare. 25 The employment effect of the higher t d is positive (negative), i.e. xL p dp=dt d ð Þ[ ð \Þ 0; depending on whether the non-numeraire commodity x is nonlabour (labour) intensive in production, i.e. L p \ð[Þ 0. Intuitively, by the discussion of equation (7), dp/dt d < 0, that is, the higher destination-based consumption tax lowers the producers' price. If the commodity x is non-labour-intensive, then 'economy-wide' employment increases.
The third term in the expression W t d is the fiscal effect of the higher t d , capturing the welfare impact of changes in the country's tax base and thus its ability to provide the public good. The term E g þ 1 À Á E q x þ E q y shows the level of tax revenue at a given rate t d . If ðE g þ 1Þ\ð[Þ 0, then we say that the public good is socially underprovided (overprovided). Optimal provision of g dictates that E g þ 1 À Á ¼ 0, that is, Samuelson's rule for optimal public good provision equalizing the marginal willingness to pay for a unit of g to its marginal cost. 26 The second component of the fiscal effect indicates that Economica © 2017 The London School of Economics and Political Science 74 ECONOMICA [JANUARY because of higher consumer prices, i.e. 1 + dp/dt d > 0 and 1 + dp*/dt d > 0, consumptions of x and y fall, thus reducing tax revenues and public good provision, subsequently welfare.
Similar arguments to those above hold for the impact of a higher t Ã d on Home's welfare, through induced terms-of-trade effect, and the employment and fiscal effects. Thus considering symmetric countries, and assuming that exported goods are nonlabour-intensive, a higher consumption tax t Ã d by Foreign exerts no terms-of-trade effect on Home's welfare, and it entails positive employment and fiscal effects. The following proposition highlights some of these results. Equations (11) and the ensuing discussion bring forth the importance of endogenous world commodity prices for the welfare effects of international commodity tax competition. In this case, since dp
it is only through a reduced fiscal effect, where
that international competition affects national welfares. Both the terms-of-trade effect and the employment effect are non-existing. (11), we obtain the two countries' best-response functions, which yield the Nash (noncooperative) consumption tax rates t N d ; t ÃN d À Á under the destination-based commodity taxation:
where is positive, and X Ã d is positive and is equivalently defined. Equations (12) indicate that the Nash equilibrium destination-based consumption taxes are positive if (i) a higher destination-based consumption tax entails a positive employment effect, and (ii) there is no overprovision of the public good.
To ascertain whether a country's Nash tax rate t N d ; t ÃN d À Á is as efficient as the cooperative one t c d ; t Ãc d À Á , we evaluate at Nash equilibrium values the impact of higher destination-based consumption taxes on the countries' joint welfare. When countries choose consumption taxes so as to maximize joint welfare, the cooperative equilibrium destination-based consumption taxes t c
Evaluating these joint welfare functions at Nash equilibrium, it suffices to sign the W Ã t d and W t Ã d terms, respectively, since at Nash equilibrium
Doing so, the effect of a higher destination-based consumption tax by Home on Foreign's welfare, evaluated at Nash equilibrium values, is
First, note that the terms-of-trade externality is zero. Intuitively, when Home raises t d , the world price of x, Foreign's imported commodity, falls, and the world price of y, Foreign's exported commodity, also falls. Under our assumption of equal-sized symmetric countries, the positive terms-of-trade externality outweighs the negative one. Thus the terms-of-trade externality becomes zero. The sign of the employment externality is positive, provided that exported goods are non-labour-intensive. Finally, the fiscal externality is also positive if there is no overprovision of the public good, and the exported goods are non-labour-intensive. 27 Intuitively, as noted above, the higher t d results in dp/dt d < 0 and dp*/dt d < 0. Foreign's demand for x and y increases, thus expanding its tax base and public good provision. Overall, under the above conditions,
[ 0, implying that Home's Nash equilibrium destination-based consumption tax is inefficiently lower compared to the country's cooperative tax rate, i.e. t N d \t c d . If any of the above assumptions does not hold, then it is possible that
The following proposition summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 2. Consider two symmetric and of equal size open economies with unemployment. When world prices are endogenous, the Nash equilibrium destinationbased consumption tax is positive and lower than its corresponding cooperative rate, if (i) the exported goods are non-labour-intensive, and (ii) there is no overprovision of the public good. Lockwood (2001) and Haufler and Pfl€ uger (2007) develop a two-country, fullemployment perfectly competitive equilibrium model, where, however, world (producers') prices are fixed, i.e. dp = dp* = 0. Changes in t d (t Ã d ) do not result in any externality in the other country, rendering the destination-based consumption taxes equally efficient as the corresponding cooperative tax rates. 28 Their results are easily reproduced by our analysis, in the presence of unemployment, since when dp = dp* = 0, equation (13) 
Origin-based consumption taxes, unemployment and welfare
Now consider the case where origin-based consumption taxes are levied on the traded commodities x and y. We continue to assume that the countries are symmetric and of equal size, i.e. h = 1. Differentiating equations (2)-(4) with respect to the originbased consumption taxes t o and t Ã o , the effects on the two countries welfare levels are as follows:
Similarly, we define for Foreign, dW
Recall from equations (9) and (10) that dp/dt o and dp Ã =dt Ã o are both negative, and that dp=dt Ã o \ð[Þ 0 and dp Ã =dt o \ð[Þ 0, depending on whether commodities are complements (substitutes) in consumption. Then it can be shown that 1 + dp/dt o and 1 þ dp Ã =dt Ã o are positive. 29 Equation (A5) in the Appendix shows that under the symmetry assumption and for h = 1, the term dp/dt o À dp*/dt o is negative regardless of whether commodities are substitutes or complements in consumption. In regards to W t o , the first right-hand-side term is again the terms-of-trade effect of the higher t o on the country's welfare. 30 In the present framework, with origin-based consumption taxes, a higher t o (t Ã o ) entails negative impact on Home's (Foreign's) welfare through the terms-of-trade effect. Thus origin-based consumption taxes entail a terms-oftrade motive for lower rather than higher consumption taxes for a country when goods are substitutes in consumption. A higher t o entails a positive (negative) employment effect if the exported goods are non-labour (labour) intensive. The third term of the expression is the induced negative private consumption effect. The last term of the expression is the fiscal effect of the higher t o on the country's welfare. It indicates that for a given tax base, i.e. E q x þ hE Ã q Ã x , the higher origin-based consumption tax ensures higher tax revenue and level of public good, which in turn exerts a positive impact on welfare. The second component of the fiscal effect is the impact of the country's higher origin-based consumption tax on own welfare, due to changes in the government's tax base, and level of public good provision. The effect is negative, that is, the higher t o lowers the tax base and level of g, thus it exerts a negative impact on the country's welfare. 31 Observing the terms in W t Ã o , similar arguments can be constructed for the terms-oftrade and employment effects of a higher t Ã o , the origin-based consumption tax by Foreign, on Home's welfare. In this case, however, when h = 1, h dp=dt Ã o À dp Ã =dt Ã o is positive, implying a positive terms-of-trade effect on Home when Foreign raises its origin-based consumption tax and goods are substitutes in consumption. The second term of W t Ã o indicates that a higher t Ã o creates a positive employment effect if the exported good is nonlabour (labour) intensive and goods are complements (substitutes) in consumption. In addition, the higher t Ã o entails a negative private consumption effect, due to higher value of imports, i.e.ÀE q y . The last term is the induced fiscal effect of the higher t Ã o , that is, the effect of the higher t Ã o on Home's welfare through changes in the country's tax base, thus level of public good provision. 32 A higher t Ã o by Foreign expands (contracts) Home's tax base, thus it raises (lowers) public good provision and welfare, if commodities x and y are substitutes (complements) in consumption. Equations (14) and the ensuing discussion, like equations (11) under destinationbased consumption taxes, bring forth the importance of endogenous world commodity prices for the welfare effects of international commodity tax competition under the origin-based taxation principle, and can reproduce these results when world commodity prices are constant. (14), we obtain the two countries' best-response functions, which yield the Nash origin-based consumption tax rates t N o ; t ÃN o . Thus, we have 
is positive, and X Ã o is positive and is equivalently defined. The Nash equilibrium originbased consumption taxes are positive if the exported goods are non-labour-intensive, and there is no overprovision of the public good. 33 To ascertain whether the countries' Nash origin-based consumption taxes are equally efficient as the cooperative ones (t c o ; t Ãc o ), we evaluate at Nash equilibrium values the impact of higher origin-based consumption taxes on the countries' joint welfare. The cooperative equilibrium, origin-based consumption taxes t c
for Foreign. Evaluating these joint welfare functions at Nash equilibrium, once again it suffices to determine the signs of the W Ã t o and W t Ã o terms, respectively, since at Nash equilibrium
Doing so, the effect of a higher origin-based Home consumption tax on Foreign's welfare, evaluated at Nash equilibrium values, is
By note 33, the sign of the combined terms-of-trade and private consumption effects is negative. Therefore a higher origin-based consumption tax by Home entails on Foreign's welfare (i) a combined negative terms-of-trade and private consumption externality, (ii) a negative employment externality if Foreign's exported good y is non-labour-intensive and commodities x and y are substitutes in consumption, and (iii) a positive fiscal externality if commodities x and y are substitutes in consumption and t ÃN o is positive. 34 Then the sign of du*/dt o depends on the magnitude of these three effects.
The following proposition summarizes the preceding discussion. overprovision of the public consumption good; (ii) is higher than its corresponding cooperative tax rate if goods are substitutes in consumption, the exported goods are non-labour-intensive, and the induced employment externality dominates the fiscal externality. Lockwood (2001) and Haufler and Pfl€ uger (2007) develop a two-country, fullemployment perfectly competitive equilibrium model, where, however, world (producers') prices are fixed, i.e. dp = dp* = 0. Changes in t o (t Ã o ) result in the private consumption externality and fiscal externality. 35 Their results are easily reproduced by setting dp = dp* = 0 in equation (16).
V. SYMMETRIC COUNTRIES OF UNEQUAL SIZE
In this section we extend the previous analysis for the case where the two otherwise symmetric-in terms of their preferences and production technologies-countries differ in population size. Thus we relax the assumption that h = 1 and we allow for h > 1 (i.e. the size of population is higher in Foreign relative to Home), or 0 < h < 1 (i.e. the population size in Foreign is smaller relative to Home). As discussed in equation (11), under the destination principle when h = 1, the terms-of-trade effect of a higher t d is zero.
Recall that this has been because an induced negative terms-of-trade effect on the country's exports is outweighed by a positive terms-of-trade effect on its imports. When h 6 ¼ 1, the two effects mentioned above are no longer equal to each other in absolute terms, thus the terms-of-trade effect of the higher t d is not equal to zero. By equation (11), the sign of the terms-of-trade effect for Home-i.e. the first term on the right-hand side of the expression for W t d -is positive (negative) when h is lower (higher) than 1.
Under origin-based consumption taxes, as in the discussion of equations (14), the sign of the terms-of-trade effect-i.e. the first term on the right-hand side of the expression for W t o -is negative when the symmetric countries are also of equal population size. When h 6 ¼ 1, the negative sign of the aforementioned term continues to hold, as long as Home is the country with the smaller population, i.e. when h > 1. However, the sign of this term becomes ambiguous once Home is the country with the larger population size, i.e. when h < 1.
Quantitatively, for h 6 ¼ 1 the magnitude of the employment effect will generally differ, although qualitatively the impact of this effect on welfare is independent of the size of h. A similar argument holds for the impact of the fiscal effect on welfare, as long as Nash equilibrium consumption taxes are positive.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we construct a perfectly competitive model of two symmetric-in terms of preferences and production technologies-countries, of equal or unequal size. Destination or origin-based taxes are levied on the consumption of goods. An institutional minimum wage leads to involuntary unemployment in both countries. Assuming an endogenous world, or producers' prices, changes in the destination-based consumption taxes entail what we call a terms-of-trade, an employment and a fiscal effect on countries' welfare. Changes in the origin-based consumption taxes entail an additional effect, the private consumption effect. We derive the Nash equilibrium consumption taxes under the two taxation principles, and compare them to their Paretoefficient rates. Although neither the destination nor the origin principle leads to socially (Pareto) efficient outcomes, we demonstrate that when symmetric countries are also of equal size, under the destination-based commodity taxation the induced terms-of-trade effect vanishes, but it does not do so under the origin-based principle. Also, under both principles and under plausible assumptions, the effect of one country's tax on the other country's level of employment is positive.
Regarding the efficiency of the non-cooperative vs. the cooperative setting of consumption taxes, we conclude that when world prices are endogenous, the Nash equilibrium destination-based consumption tax is lower than the corresponding cooperative equilibrium rate, if exported goods are non-labour-intensive. A heuristic policy recommendation could be made by extrapolating this result, for example, to the case of intra-EU trade. Zeddies (2013) reports that within the EU, the major proportion of bilateral trade involves commodities that employ medium-to high-skilled labour. This pattern is more pronounced when we refer to trade between 'old' EU members and 'new' entrants, with the former exporting to the latter products of high skilled intensity-i.e. in our framework those defined as non-labour-intensive-and importing from them products of low-skilled labour intensity-i.e. those that we define as labour-intensive. If so, then on the grounds of our analysis it follows that an increase in VAT for the old members implies a positive employment effect. On the contrary, for new entrants it is a reduction in commodity taxation that may result to a domestic positive employment effect when world producer prices are affected by tax policies.
In the benchmark case of fixed world prices, the Nash equilibrium destination-based consumption tax is equally efficient to its corresponding cooperative rate. The Nash equilibrium origin-based taxes, regardless of whether producers' prices are fixed or endogenous, can be either higher or lower than the corresponding cooperative rates.
APPENDIX

Commodity tax competition and producer prices
Under the destination principle, total differentiation of equations (5) and (6) yields the following matrix system:
3 5 dp dp Ã
Then equations (7) and (8) emerge. Using equations (A1), (7) and (8), the effect of changes in t d on p and p* can be written as 
Then the determinant of the right-hand-side matrix of the coefficients of the unknowns is
and is positive. Also, in (A2) dp/dt d < 0 and dp*/dt d < 0. Similar methodology supports the rest of the signs, that is, dp=dt Ã d \0 and dp Ã =dt Ã d \0. Under the origin principle, total differentiation of equations (5) and (6) yields the following matrix system:
from which equations (9) and (10) emerge. Using equations (A3), (9) and (10), the effect of changes in t o on p and p* can be written as
Following the argument for the sign of dp/dt d in equation (A2), we can also conclude that dp/dt o < 0 and dp Ã =dt Ã o \0, while the signs of dp=dt Ã o and dp*/dt o are ambiguous. Moreover, due to symmetry (e.g.
Given that the direct effect of a price change dominates its indirect one on compensated demands, the sign of the right-hand-side expression in equation (A5) is negative regardless of the relationship of the two commodities in consumption. while in the opposite case we call it non-labour-intensive. In analogy to Neary (1993) and Kreickemeier (2005) , a commodity is labelled (non-)labour-intensive if an increase in its producer price (lowers) raises the economy-wide employment. In our case, when the producer or world price of the exported good falls due to a higher t d , and the commodity is non-labour-intensive, employment in the production of the numeraire commodity rises by more than it falls in the non-numeraire good sector, thus inducing a positive employment effect in the economy. Note also that in the presence of many factors, a commodity being 'nonlabour-intensive' is not equivalent to being 'capital-intensive'. 18. Since by assumption all households are identical, and by appropriate normalization N = 1, the E(.) function captures both the representative consumer and the country's aggregate expenditure function. In this way and without loss of generality, u, u* are interchangeably interpreted as the individual or the country's aggregate utility/welfare level. 19. These assumptions are supported by a quasi-linear utility function, e.g. V x; y; z; g ð Þ¼v x; y ð Þþz þ f g ð Þ. The latter is used, by and large, in the relevant literature; see, for example, Lockwood (2001) , Haufler and Pfl€ uger (2007) and Moriconi and Sato (2009) . 20. For analytical simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that the unit cost of public good provision is constant and equal to 1 in both countries; see, for example, Haufler and Pfl€ uger (2007) , and Moriconi and Sato (2009) . 21. This is a widely used assumption in the international trade-public finance nexus; see, for example, Emran (2005) and Emran and Stiglitz (2005) . We also maintain this assumption throughout the analysis. 22. When x and y are complements in consumption, consumption of the numeraire z must rise in both countries, that is, z must be a substitute in consumption to at least one of the other two commodities, for the countries' income constraints to be met. 23. In our study, a (benevolent) government has no objective (i.e. utility) of its own. It maximizes the representative household's welfare. This is tantamount to maximizing national welfare W (W*). A linear transformation of W (W*) can also include a utility function of the government (fiscal authority). This specification of national welfare, with or without a government objective function, is often used in perfectly competitive trade models; see, for example, Chao and Yu (1993) . 24. From equations (7) and (8), À1 < dp/dt d < 0 and À1 < dp*/dt d < 0. Then 1 + dp/dt d = dq x /dt d and 1 + dp*/dt d = dq y /dt d are positive. 25. If either of these assumptions does not hold, as discussed in the final section of the paper, then with endogenous producers' prices, the terms-of-trade-effect under destination-based consumption taxes does not disappear. 26. The assumption of optimal provision of the public good can easily be supported by introducing lump-sum taxes in equations (1), (3) and (4), and assuming that their levels are set by each government noncooperatively (Nash) in order to ensure the optimal provision of g and g*. Since in our analysis the addition of lump-sum taxes makes no difference whatsoever to the results, wherever required, we simply assume that g and g* are locally optimally provided. 27. Recall from equations (12) that under these assumptions, t ÃN d is positive. 28. See Lockwood (2001, Propositions 1 and 2) and Haufler and Pfl€ uger (2007, Proposition 1) . 29. By equations (9) and (10),
30. The complete expression for this term is À E q x À p p À Á dp=dt o ð ÞþE q y dp Ã =dt o ð Þ h i , which due to the symmetry assumption reduces to the above term; see the discussion of equations (11) . 31. Using equations (9) and (10), after some algebra, the second component of the fiscal effect can be written as
which is negative. 32. Using equations (9) and (10), after some algebra, the fiscal effect of t Ã o in the expression W t Ã o can be written as ÀE g t o D À1 E q x q y þ hE Ã q Ã x q Ã y p pp p Ã p Ã p Ã . 33. With underprovision of the public good, E g [ 1, and hE g þ dp Ã =dt o À h dp=dt o is negative for h = 1, since by equations (9) and (10), À1 þ dp Ã dt o À dp dt o ¼ D À1 Z y À E q y q x þ E Ã (9) and (10), after some algebra, the fiscal effect of t o in the expression W Ã t o can be written as ÀhE Ã Lockwood (2001, Propositions 1 and 2) and Haufler and Pfl€ uger (2007, Proposition 1) .
